# Computability with higher-order functions

Daniel Gratzer Tuesday 29<sup>th</sup> April, 2025

**Turings Venner** 

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- I'm interested in programming languages.

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Real type theory, done by real type theorists:

 $\begin{aligned} &\hom_{\widehat{C}}(X, f^*d_*Z) \\ &\simeq \prod_{c:\langle \operatorname{op}|C \rangle} X(c) \to \operatorname{hom}(f^{\dagger}c, d) \to Z \\ &\simeq \left( \sum_{c:\langle \operatorname{op}|C \rangle} X(c) \times \operatorname{hom}(f^{\dagger}c, d) \right) \to Z \end{aligned}$ 

# Good news: I'm not talking about type theory today

Today's talk:

- not my work!
- not super proof-y/rigorous
- mostly from a blogpost I read 10+ years ago.
- we get to where we get to; just interrupt with questions  $\ensuremath{\textcircled{$\odot$}}$

Real goal: show something I found surprising and exciting



## What sort of problems admit *computable* solutions?

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- considered informally in math for a *long* time
- lots of attention in the early  $20^{\text{th}}$  century
- NB: predates computers as we know them



#### Definition

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Small quiz, do we know who those people are?



#### Definition

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Why is this a good definition though?

# The Chuch–Turing Hypothesis

Turing machines unintuitive, I propose the following instead:

Definition (Daniel computability)

 $f : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$  is computable if Daniel can guess f(n) for each n in  $\leq 3$  seconds.

More seriously: why not some other definition?

We hypothesize all reasonable ones coincide:

#### Thesis

All effective models of computation encode the same computable functions  $\mathbb{N} \rightharpoonup \mathbb{N}.$ 

Primary evidence:

Theorem (Church, Turing, Rosser, ...)

Turing machines, the  $\lambda$ -calculus, Post's machines, ... all recover the same functions

So, why is this a good definition? It's incredibly robust

And thus the problem of what computation is was solved forever...

We actually have two problems to consider:

- 1. How do we describe *data* (how do we describe/encode input and output)
- 2. How do we describe *computation*

Thus far, we've basically assumed that our data was various natural numbers.



- $\bullet\,$  We can encode a lot of stuff using just  $\mathbb N$
- As CS people, we encode stuff as a bunch of bits all the time!

So... why care about anything besides  $\mathbb{N}$ ?



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- As CS people, we encode stuff as a bunch of bits all the time!
- Mathematician term: Gödel encoding

So... why care about anything besides  $\mathbb{N}?$ 

Two basic ways we could fail to adequately encode something:

- Need to make sure every widget w is represented by some  $n (n \Vdash w)$ .
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The halting problem is decidable... if we encode a TM with a halting bit in front!

Where this comes to a head: computing with functions.

- The halting problem etc., are about computing with source-code
- Can we study what it means to just compute with functions on their own?

Serious problems encoding these as natural numbers if we want all functions...

# If this was a math-y talk

I can't resist just defining computability structures:

Definition (via Longley-Normann)

A computability structure C basically describes

- A collection of types T
- A bunch of sets  $C_{\tau}$  describing the values of type  $\tau$ .
- A predicate comp :  $(C_{\tau} \rightharpoonup C_{\sigma}) \rightarrow \{\top, \bot\}$  telling us what's *C*-computable.
- We insist that C-computable functions contain (1) the identity and (2) compose.

Just a way to talk about computing with different data.



Really, what we want to think about is a programming language!

- We have a bunch of types and values/constants
- We know how to run a program on an input and inspect the result.

Our goal: study what programs we can write at types other than nat.

The bitter truth:

Theorem

The Church–Turing thesis does **not** extend to computability at higher type.<sup>1</sup>

This is actually true already for the  $\lambda$ -calculus and Turing machines.

(Be careful though! This is sensitive to how we encode functions)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>One way to mathematize this:  $\mathbf{RT}(\mathcal{K}_1)$  is not equivalent to  $\mathbf{RT}(\mathcal{K}_2)$ .

Our goal for the rest of the day: give an example such a divergence.

- To describe our example, we need a programming language for it.
- I am a PL person; become agitated if my talk doesn't introducing a new language.

Let's define a baby functional programming language to work in.

Questions? 5 minute break?

I want a language with the following types:

- 1. Natural numbers nat
- 2. Booleans bool
- 3. First-class functions  $\tau \rightarrow \sigma$

The basic values of these types are as follows:

true:bool false:bool  $ar{n}:$ nat fn $x 
ightarrow e: au 
ightarrow \sigma$ 

Besides values, we have a few key program constructs we'll use:

- Recursive functions
- if b then  $e_t$  else  $e_f$
- $\bullet \ \texttt{inc}, \texttt{dec}: \texttt{nat} \to \texttt{nat}$
- isZero : nat  $\rightarrow$  bool

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Sometimes called PCF

let n + m =
 if isZero(n) then m else inc(dec(n) + m)
let n \* m =
 if isZero(n) then 0 else m + (dec(n) \* m)
let factorial n =
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We're using Currying for multi-argument functions; could also just add pairs.



#### type $BitStream = nat \rightarrow bool$

## **type** $BitStreamPred = BitStream \rightarrow bool$

Our main result:

Theorem

We can decide the equality of total BitStreamPreds:

 $\mathsf{eq}:\mathsf{BitStreamPred}\to\mathsf{BitStreamPred}\to\mathtt{bool}$ 

This result is a bit hard to attribute precisely; it has many related incarnations

In addition to Berger, Escardó, and Simpson, these people are certainly relevant:







All of these operators are hereditarily total:

- For ground types (bool, nat), hereditary totality is just termination.
- For  $\tau \rightarrow \sigma,~{\rm HT}$  means mapping HT inputs to HT outputs.

#### Example

An HT BitStreamPred needs to terminate only when given an HT bitstream

### Warning!

All of our operators may do whatever they want on non-HT inputs

No, this is actually very weird:

- BitStream does not admit decidable equality.
- (nat 
  ightarrow nat) 
  ightarrow bool does not admit decidable equality.
- This is *not true* for Turing machine model!

Consequence:  $nat \rightarrow bool$  and  $nat \rightarrow nat$  are not equivalent!

#### Key Idea

The only way to use a function  $f : \tau \to \sigma$  is to apply f.

- In particular: all we can do with f : BitStream is query bits
- If  $\Phi(f)$ : BitStreamPred terminates, then  $\Phi$  queries only finitely many bits of f.
- In fact, upper bound for these queries across all *f*s

## Theorem

If  $\Phi$  : BitStreamPred is HT, then there is N such that:

 $\forall f,g : \mathsf{BitStream}. f,g \text{ are } HT \rightarrow (\forall i \leq N. f(i) = g(i)) \rightarrow \Phi(f) = \Phi(g)$ 

Informally:  $\Phi$  never looks past N bits of its input.

*N* is the *modulus of uniform continuity* of  $\Phi$ .

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**"Proof".**To the board! □

# Moral idea

To compute  $\Phi = \Psi$ , suffices to check output on finitely many cases  $(2^{\max(N_{\Phi}, N_{\Psi})})$ .

This... isn't enough.

- Given  $\Phi$ , if we could *compute* N, that'd be good.
- This is possible
- Subtle differences in definition of modulus of uniform continuity matter

We'll be more indirect, but it only works because of N's existence.

 $\mathsf{search}:\mathsf{BitStreamPred}\to\mathsf{BitStream}$ 

 $\mathsf{forall}:\mathsf{BitStreamPred}\to\mathsf{bool}$ 

 $\mathsf{exists}:\mathsf{BitStreamPred}\to\mathsf{bool}$ 

We'll define these three functions

 $\textbf{search}: \mathsf{BitStreamPred} \to \mathsf{BitStream}$ 

 $\mathsf{forall}:\mathsf{BitStreamPred}\to\mathsf{bool}$ 

 $\mathsf{exists}:\mathsf{BitStreamPred}\to\mathsf{bool}$ 

Find an example satisfying this predicate, otherwise return junk

 $\mathsf{search}:\mathsf{BitStreamPred}\to\mathsf{BitStream}$ 

 $\textbf{forall}: \mathsf{BitStreamPred} \to \mathsf{bool}$ 

 $\mathsf{exists}:\mathsf{BitStreamPred}\to\mathsf{bool}$ 

Check whether a predicate is always true

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Check whether a predicate is ever true

Suppose that we have search, forall, and exists:

eq : BitStreamPred  $\rightarrow$  BitStreamPred  $\rightarrow$  bool eq  $\Phi \Psi = \text{forall}(\texttt{fn} \ s \rightarrow \Phi(s) = \Psi(s))$ 

Moral: two predicates being equal everywhere can be expressed as a third predicate!

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Moral: two predicates being equal everywhere can be expressed as a third predicate!

Let's assume search for a bit:

exists, forall : BitStreamPred  $\rightarrow$  bool exists  $\Phi = \Phi(\text{search}(\Phi))$ forall  $\Phi = \text{not}(\text{exists}(\texttt{fn } s \rightarrow \text{not}(\Phi(s))))$  Let's assume search for a bit:

exists, forall : BitStreamPred  $\rightarrow$  bool exists  $\Phi = \Phi(\text{search}(\Phi))$ forall  $\Phi = \text{not}(\text{exists}(\texttt{fn } s \rightarrow \text{not}(\Phi(s))))$ 

Something is always true if it's not the case that it's ever false.

Questions? 5 minute break?

Now, at last, we arrive at search.

Big idea:

- First, run search on fn  $s \to \Phi(\texttt{false} \rhd s)^2$
- If the result s actually satisfies  $\Phi(\texttt{false} \triangleright -)$ , return  $\texttt{false} \triangleright s$ .
- Otherwise, return whatever we can find for  $fn \ s \rightarrow \Phi(true \triangleright s)$  with true append.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> $\triangleright$  appends something to the start:  $(b \triangleright s) n = if isZero(n)$  then b else s(dec(n))

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```
let search s =
    if \Phi(\operatorname{search}(\operatorname{fn} s \to \Phi(\operatorname{false} \rhd s)))
    then false <math>\triangleright search(fn s \to \Phi(\operatorname{false} \rhd s))
    else true <math>\triangleright search(fn s \to \Phi(\operatorname{true} \rhd s))
```

<sup>2</sup> $\triangleright$  appends something to the start:  $(b \triangleright s) n = if isZero(n)$  then b else s(dec(n))

If  $\Phi(s) =$ true, what happens?

- $\Phi(...)$  will always be true, so immediately get to then clause.
- Now return false ▷ search(fn \_ → true).
- Clearly HT: just going to keep yield the stream of falses

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Moment of thought: search(fn  $\_ \rightarrow false$ ) yields a stream of trues.

- If  $\Phi(s) = s(0)$ , what happens?
  - $\Phi(\texttt{false} \triangleright -) = \texttt{fn} \_ \rightarrow \texttt{false}$ , so first if will send us to else
  - We're now computing  $true \triangleright search(fn \_ \rightarrow true)$ .
  - Back to the previous case: now have true followed by only falses

The general argument:

- We are making recursive calls to search  $\Phi(\texttt{false} \rhd -), \Phi(\texttt{false} \rhd -)$
- If  $\Phi$  is depth d, these are depth d-1.
- We can inductively argue hereditary termination from this.

Crucial point: since every  $\Phi$  has a modulus of uniform continuity, all have finite depth.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup>We actually need the *intensional* version of the modulus of uniform continuity. Don't worry about it.

Here is a function  $\mathtt{nat} \to \mathtt{nat}$  which is not uniformly continuous:

 $f \ s = s(s(0))$ 

This is where the argument breaks down for deciding  $(nat \rightarrow nat) \rightarrow bool$ .

# Questions?

In which Daniel bravely attempts to do some live coding.

How did Escardó come up with this code/the more complex searches?

- not (just) by meditating on functional programs
- there is actually mathematical reasoning behind it!

In fact, a lot of what we've just argued stems from a foundational topological result:

#### Theorem

The Cantor space  $C \subseteq [0, 1]$  is compact.

# Key Ideas

Effective computation is continuous

In the case of PCF, we have an (adequate) model where:

- HT elements of BitStream are roughly C
- HT elements of BitStreamPred are roughly continuous functions  $C \rightarrow \{0,1\}$

Compactness upgrades "continuous" to "uniformly continuous" and the rest unfolds.

From Escardó:

Thus, in a more abstract level, topology is applied as a paradigm for discovering unforeseen notions, algorithms and theorems in computability theory.

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- Very much ongoing! (Algebraic/differential geometry, stone spaces,  $\infty$ -categories)
- The connection between computation and geometry is deep & profound.

Where I learned of this (by Martín Escardó)

- https://math.andrej.com/2007/09/28/seemingly-impossible-functional-programs/
- Infinite sets that admit fast exhaustive search
- Exhaustible sets in higher-type computation

Lots of relevant and interesting stuff on Andrej Bauer's blog!

- Gunter: Semantics of Programming Languages
- Vickers: Topology via Logic
- Abramsky & Jung: Domain Theory
- Longley & Normann: Higher-order Computability
- Van Oosten: Realizability theory: an introduction to its categorical side
- Pratchett: Going postal

My office is Turing 127. Always happy to chat  $\odot$ 

Thanks



















Escardó





Simpson



Kleene



Kreisel



Longley



Normann



Post



Scott



